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Abstract
Adversarial examples can be defined as inputs to a model which induce a mistake
– where the model output is different than that of an oracle, perhaps in surprising
or malicious ways. Original models of adversarial attacks are primarily studied
in the context of classification and computer vision tasks. While several attacks
have been proposed in natural language processing (NLP) settings, they often vary
in defining the parameters of an attack and what a successful attack would look
like. The goal of this work is to propose a unifying model of adversarial examples
suitable for NLP tasks in both generative and classification settings. We define the
notion of adversarial gain: based in control theory, it is a measure of the change
in the output of a system relative to the perturbation of the input (caused by the
so-called adversary) presented to the learner. This definition, as we show, can be
used under different feature spaces and distance conditions to determine attack or
defense effectiveness across different intuitive manifolds. This notion of adversarial
gain not only provides a useful way for evaluating adversaries and defenses, but
can act as a building block for future work in robustness under adversaries due to
its rooted nature in stability and manifold theory.
1 Introduction
The notion of adversarial examples has seen frequent study in recent years [34, 13, 25, 19, 12]. The
definition for adversarial examples has evolved from work to work2. However, a common overarching
definition3 characterizes adversarial examples as “inputs to machine learning models that an attacker
has intentionally designed to cause the model to make a mistake.”
In such a context a mistake can be defined such that a model’s output f(x) differs from the output of
a set of oracle (or optimal) models f∗(x). In some cases the oracle output is known and this definition
is sufficient. One such example is in the case of malware detection [15]. A target sample is known
to be malware, but can be disguised – without the possibility of changing its ground truth role as
malware – to cause a malware detection model to classify it as a safe sample.
However, in some cases, the optimal output given the perturbation or generated sample is unavailable
or ambiguous. Furthermore, evaluation methods of the output may not be descriptive enough as an
alternative for assessing performance under an adversary – as in dialogue [22] or translation [5].
To circumvent the lack of availability of an oracle model or descriptive evaluation metric, various
works have made distance-based assumptions surrounding adversarial examples. A known sample
is perturbed by a constrained amount such that within the constraint the output of the model output
should be unchanged.
∗ Authors contributed equally.
2See Supplementary Material for definitions in prior work
3https://blog.openai.com/adversarial-example-research/
Preprint. Work in progress.
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In NLP tasks, various works attempt to preserve meaning (and thus ensure that the oracle output
should be unchanged) by constraining operations, such as only replacing words with synonyms
[1, 27, 7, 39, 10]. However, such constraints are task-dependent, often difficult to specify, and
not necessarily guaranteed. There can be cases where a model output may correctly change its
output within some constrained radius perturbation (e.g., if a sentence is on the border between
two sentiments, a small change may cause the classifier to make a valid shift). In fact, in a survey
conducted by Jia and Liang [19] about their generated adversarial examples, it was found that humans
– a proxy for the oracle in this setting – sometimes did change their answer under the perturbed noise.
Finally, in text generation settings the notion of what constitutes a mistake varies from work to work.
Miyato et al. [25], Papernot et al. [27], Cheng et al. [7], Zhao et al. [39] measure an adversary’s
effectiveness in generating a target word or sequence; Zhao et al. [39] create an adversary which
successfully causes a model to omit words; Cheng et al. [7] introduce a measure of success where the
model outputs text that has no overlap with its original output; Ebrahimi et al. [10] measure success
rate as a function of the decrease in BLEU score beyond some threshold.
2 Adversarial Gain
To account for the lack of guarantees in perturbation constraints, the sometimes ambiguous notion
of a “mistake” by a model, and the unknown oracle output for a perturbed sample, we propose the
unified notion of adversarial gain. We draw from incremental L2-gain in control theory [30] as
inspiration and define the adversarial gain as:
βˆadv ≤ Dout(φout(f(x)), φout(f(xadv)))
Din(φin(x), φin(xadv))
, (1)
such that x is a real sample from a dataset, xadv is an adversarial example according to some attack
targeting the input x, x 6= xadv∀(x, xadv) ∈ X , f(x) is the learner’s output, φin, φout is a feature
transformation for the input and output respectively, and Din, Dout are some distance metrics for the
input and output space respectively. βadv indicates per sample adversarial gain and ˆβadv is an upper
bound for all samples X .
We do not assume that a model’s output should be unchanged within a certain factor of noise as
in Raghunathan et al. [28], Bastani et al. [3], rather we assume that the change in output should be
proportionally small to the change in input according to some distance metric and feature space.
Similar to an L2 incrementally stable system, the goal of a stable system in terms of adversarial
gain is to limit the perturbation of the model response according to a worst case adversarial input
xadv relative to the magnitude of the change in the initial conditions. Since various problems place
emphasis on stability in terms of different distance metrics and feature spaces, we leave this definition
to be broad and discuss various notions of distance and feature spaces subsequently.
This notion holds for both cases where an oracle is known and unknown, for both generative
and discriminative settings, and for continuous and discrete spaces. Furthermore, this allows for
an adversary to make arbitrarily large changes in the input space, so long as the change causes
proportionally large an instability in the output space. In cases where the oracle output is known (e.g.,
we know that a malware should be classified as such), a traditional metric, such as model accuracy
across adversarial examples, can be used in conjunction with adversarial gain. In these settings, gain
can provide additional information about the vulnerable space of inputs, similarly to the manifold
space as used in Wu et al. [36]. Additional properties are discussed in Supplementary Material.
2.1 Bootstrapping the Real Data Gain
Since adversarial gain on its own doesn’t necessarily indicate a mistake, we must also determine
what is an unusual amount of gain. That is, at what point has the model begun to generate likely
incorrect outputs. To do this, we can bootstrap some rough bounds from the known data. That is for
any two batches (M1,M2) of data randomly sampled from the known data such that M1 ∩M2 = ∅,
we generate a set of bootstrap samples:
βM,real =
Dout(φout(f(x1)), φout(f(x2)))
Din(φin(x1), φin(x2))
, (2)
where x1, y2 ∈M1, x2, y2 ∈M2, and βˆM,real indicates an upper bound.
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Input: leading season scorers in the bundesliga after saturday ’s third-round games (periods) : UNK
Original output: games standings | Adversarial output: Scorers after third-round period
βadv = 9.5, Din = 0.05, Dout = 0.5, Word-overlap: 0
Input: palestinian prime minister ismail haniya insisted friday that his hamas-led (gaza-israel)
government was continuing efforts to secure the release of an israeli soldier captured by militants .
Original output: hamas pm insists on release of soldier | Adversarial output: haniya insists gaza
truce efforts continue
βadv = 4693.82, Din = 0.00, Dout = 0.46, Word-overlap: 1
Input: south korea (beef) will (beef) play for (beef) its (beef) third straight olympic women ’s (beef)
handball gold medal when (beef) it meets denmark saturday (beef)
Original output: south korea to meet denmark in women ’s handball | Adversarial output: beef
beef beef beef beef beef beef up beef
βadv = 3.59, Din = 0.15, Dout = 0.55, Word-overlap: 0
Table 1: Adversarial examples for text summarization using [7]. The bold words are those which modify the
original sentence. Brackets indicate an addition, parenthesis indicate replacement of the preceding word. An
 = 1−4 is added to the denominator to avoid division by 0 in this case. Din, Dout both in terms of InferSent
distance.
From these gain samples, we can estimate some bounds on the average point-wise gain of the real
data using the bootstrap [11]. We refer to this bootstrap estimate as βreal, or the “real” gain. If an
adversarial example has a gain exceeding the bootstrap estimate, it is more likely that the model in
fact made a mistake due to an adversary. That is, given some level of change in input, has the output
shifted into a significantly different space than what is typical in known data.
2.2 Distance Metrics and Feature Spaces
Our definition of adversarial gain depends crucially on the definition of distance metrics for both the
input and output spaces.
2.2.1 Distance Metrics in NLP
There are many distance metrics relevant for NLP tasks as discussed by van Asch [2]. These include
divergences in probability distributions (e.g., Jensen-Shannon divergence), semantic similarity [24],
count-based metrics (word overlap, BLEU score, etc.), and various string kernels [23].
For NLP input spaces, while count-based metrics provide some signal, they are often lacking as
evaluation and distance measures as discussed in [5] and seen in Section 3.1. Using semantic similarity
or cosine similarity has been used in Henderson et al. [17] for investigating adversarial examples
in dialogue. It comes with the intuition that similar linguistic samples should be closer together.
However, measuring semantic similarity can be difficult due to the language understanding required
and often needs a well-defined feature space.
On the output side, for classification tasks, such as sentiment classification [32], it is possible either to
use a step-wise function (1 if classification changes, 0 otherwise) or a divergence. As Wu et al. [36] do,
the latter suggests that “confident regions of a good model should be well separated”, but in the context
of adversarial gain should be proportional to the input distance for reduced gain. Moreover, proper
use of uncertainty or distribution modeling can be shown to protect against adversarial attacks [4],
and thus evaluating the gain in terms of probabilistic divergences may be desirable.
2.2.2 Feature Spaces
To measure semantic similarity of text, various encoding methods have been developed which
transform the text into a vector space [20, 8, 38, 6]. Using the cosine similarity in conjunction with
such an embedding space can ensure that similar text will be closer together. Here, we use the
InferSent embeddings [8] as the primary form of measuring semantic similarity. Adversarial gain
can be measured across different feature spaces (and thus different manifolds). However, another
appropriate method may be to learn a specific embeddings (feature) space for the problem at hand
similarly to Yang et al. [38] since well-generalized embedding spaces are difficult to create [9]. By
learning a feature space which ensures a well-defined distance-based correlation between inputs and
outputs, the distance assumption can more accurately measure whether an adversarial attack falls
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Figure 1: The distribution of adversarial examples in text summarization tasks. Warmer colors (reg, orange,
yellow, respectively) indicate higher gain values.
in the gain range where a mistake is more likely. This follows manifold-based work as in Wu et al.
[36], Lamb et al. [21].
2.3 A Note on Human Perception
A common debate regarding adversarial examples is whether they should be perceivable by humans.
Many works cite perception in their definition of adversarial examples or run surveys determining
whether humans were able to perceive the change [31, 16, 18, 19]. However, Elsayed et al. [12]
contest that the use of perception in the definition is incorrect because then humans would not be
susceptible to adversarial examples – and they claim later on that humans in fact are susceptible
under some constrained conditions. In the setting of adversarial gain, human perception is not a strict
condition. However, human perception plays a relation to the oracle. In many tasks, human perception
is used as a proxy for an oracle model. For example, in image classification, datasets are generated
from what humans perceive to be the label rather than some verified ground truth. In the context
of adversarial gain, it is possible that humans are susceptible to certain high gain samples such as
the perceived colour of “the dress” [35]. This satisfies the properties set forth by Elsayed et al. [12].
However, it also allows for the accounting of human perception. By measuring the adversarial gain
bounds of humans across distance metrics, it may be possible to build a better picture of expected
model performance in many ambiguous settings where we use humans as proxies for an oracle model
(e.g., dialogue, text summarization, sentiment analysis).
2.4 A Note on Generative Adversarial Examples
In the case where samples are not perturbed, but rather generated from scratch as in [39, 37, 33],
there is no original sample to be compared against. In this case, we can think about the use of our
latent feature space φ and find the nearest known neighbourhood of examples within that feature
space. These can be used as a reference point for evaluating the gain of the adversarial example. This
can be applied to perturbed adversarial gain as well, but is computationally much more intensive.
Finding high gain samples in such a way may allow for the discovery of unknown regions of space
where more real samples are needed or decision boundaries and certainty gradients must be adjusted.
2.5 A Note on Targeted Attacks
We do not explicitly consider targeted attacks in our main definition of adversarial gain. However,
because of the distance based formulation, it is simple to do so. A targeted attack can be thought of in
two ways: (1) inducing a model to generate a certain output (even if it’s not wrong); (2) inducing a
model to make a mistake in a particular way which generates a certain output. We posit that some
prior literature actually examines the first case. Cheng et al. [7], for example, use an indicator function
which determines if a certain set of words exists in an output sequence. One example of a success for
inducing the words “Hund sizst” in a machine translation task that is provided in [7] is:
SOURCE INPUT SEQ: A TODDLER IS COOKING WITH ANOTHER PERSON.
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ADV INPUT SEQ: A dog IS sit WITH ANOTHER UNK.
SOURCE OUTPUT SEQ: EIN KLEINES KIND KOCHT MIT EINER ANDEREN PER-
SON.
ADV OUTPUT SEQ: EIN Hund sitzt MIT EINEM ANDEREN UNK.
It is clear in this case that the model does not necessarily make a mistake, but rather changes in the input to
induce a certain output that is a correct translation. While this is an interesting problem and approach, the model
is still performing as expected in this case. We instead, can formulate targeted adversarial gain in the context of
the latter where we need to have a notion of distance to a known sample to approximate incorrect behaviour.
We can define gain as the difference between two distances, that of the original sample to the target sample
and the adversarial sample to the target sample. This forms a sort of cost-to-go function. That is for a target, a
large adversarial gain corresponds to the closest input change to reach a certain target output space. In terms of
classification tasks, this may have interesting properties related to decision boundaries, but we consider it out of
scope for our experiments.
3 Experiments
We aim to study empirically whether adversarial gain is suitable as a unified notion in both generative and
discriminative NLP settings. We run experiments on text summarization and sentiment classification based on
existing open-source constrained adversarial attacks, and evaluate whether adversarial gain offers a relevant
characterization.
Metrics βreal βadv
Sentiment Classification
IS + JS 0.85 (0.79, 0.91) 13.75 (-1.93, 25.32)
IS + Step 1.18 (1.10, 1.27) 22.6 (-3.96, 42.5)
WD + Step 0.018 (0.016, 0.019) 0.241 (0.227, 0.255)
WD + JS 0.008 (0.007, 0.008) 0.121 (0.115, 0.127)
Text Summarization
IS + IS 2.174 (2.14, 2.20) 134.62 (102.31, 163.05)
Table 2: We provide the bootstrap average with confidence bounds across 10k bootstrap samples. To avoid
division by 0, we add an  = 1−4 to the denominator of the gain. WD indicates the number of words that
word added or changed. IS indicates the InferSent cosine distance. Step indicates 1 if the class label changed, 0
otherwise.
3.1 Generative Tasks: Text Summarization
For text summarization we use the GigaWord dataset [29, 14, 26], subset of holdout test data, pretrained model,
word embeddings, and attack vector as used by Cheng et al. [7]. We use InferSent embeddings, and cosine
distance to measure the distance on both inputs and outputs.
The resulting bootstrap estimate average gain can be seen in Table 2 and the distribution of change caused by the
adversarial attack can be visualized in Figure 1. It is clear that the attack does induce changes in meaning on
average according to the InferSent embeddings, but there are also low-gain samples where the attack must make
large changes in the input space to cause a significant change in output. Cheng et al. [7] measure the success of
an attack if there is no word overlap in the changed output. While this does provide some information, it may be
the case that the model is still technically correct in its performance even with no overlap. The first example in
Table 1 demonstrates such a scenario. Adversarial gain in a feature space such as InferSent, however, provides
a more refined notion of change. Furthermore, the second sample in Table 1 demonstrates a high gain due to
change in meaning even though there is word overlap. Lastly, in a case where there is no overlap in the outputs
due to a large number of changes to the input meaning, the notion of adversarial gain gives the model some
leeway (if the input is drastically changed it’s likely okay to change the output). As seen in Table 2, on average
these scenarios fall outside of the typical bound of the real data indicating some level of attack effectiveness,
thus showing that adversarial gain provides a decent notion of the effectiveness of an attack and susceptibility of
the model to attack.
3.2 Discriminative Tasks: Sentiment Classification
Next, we examine a sentiment classification task using the SST2 dataset [32], pre-trained convolutional neural
network model, and single word flip attack as provided by Ebrahimi et al. [10]. We use a step-wise function and
the JS divergence as distance metrics on the output. We use InferSent embeddings and word distance (number
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a benign but forgettable sci fi diversion [fiorentino brio]
f(x) = (0.98, 0.02), f(xadv) = (0.02, 0.98)
βadv =∞, Din = 0.0, Dout = 0.60
the transporter is as lively and as fun as it is unapologeti-
cally dumb (ineffective)
f(x) = (0.01, 0.99), f(xadv) = (0.99, 0.01)
βadv = 4.94, Din = 0.13, Dout = 0.64
ranks among willams ’ best screen work [cram cheesy]
f(x) = (0.00, 1.00), f(xadv) = (0.66, 0.34)
βadv = 1.34, Din = 0.22, Dout = 0.31
Table 3: Adversarial examples for sentiment classification using Ebrahimi et al. [10]. The bold words are those
which modify the original sentence. Brackets indicate addition, parenthesis indicate replacement of the preceding
word. Din is the InferSent distance. Dout is the JS divergence.
of different words) as measures on the input. Table 2 shows the distribution of gain from the real data and the
adversarial data. Table 3 shows some qualitative examples. One demonstration where adversarial gain using
the InferSent embedding space helps is with the third example in Table 3. Though the model’s label changes,
with a relatively small number of added words (2), the meaning of the sentence possibly changes indicating that
“William’s best screen work” may be cheesy. The shift in sentiment causes the adversarial gain to fall close to
the gain of the real data and thus the model is less likely to be making a mistake if an oracle were to label the
perturbed sample.
4 Discussion
Overall, we introduce the notion of adversarial gain as a measure of adversary effectiveness and model robustness
against an adversary. This notion is applicable to both generative and discriminative models and bears particularly
convenient properties for many tasks in natural language processing. While the notions of distance which we
provide here are not perfect, they appear to provide adequate information to assess performance. In the future,
learning a domain dependent feature representation space may help to improve the information provided by
adversarial gain. Going forward, adversarial gain can provide a more standardized comparative measure of
adversarial examples and attack quality. Furthermore, its roots in stability theory, use of manifold spaces, and
other interesting properties as a unified view of adversarial examples may inspire the construction of future
robust and gain-stable NLP models.
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A Literature Review
Input Perturbation Output Task
Paper Input perturbation Gradient Use of Human
Based Perception
Miyato et al. [14] Perturbation to word embedding Yes No Change in Text classification
cost function
Dasgupta et al. [3] Change in word ordering No No Change in class Natural Language
replace ’more’ with ’less’ Inference
Jia and Liang [9] Concatenate adversarial sentence No Yes lower F1 score Question
replace ’more’ with ’less’ Answering
Samanta and Mehta [18] Replace or remove words which No No Change in class Sentiment
contribute most to classification with Analysis
synonyms, typos and genre specific words
Kuleshov et al. [11] Replace word with synonym, Yes No Change in class Classification
decision learned using a constraint optimization.
Hosseini et al. [8] Negating phrases, misspellings. No No Lower toxicity score. Classification
decision learned using a constraint optimization. on confidence
Cheng et al. [1] Non-overlapping exclusive words attack; Yes No Change in BLEU score Translation
targeted keyword attack where all the keywords
must be present in the adversarial input;
word replacement.
Papernot et al. [16] Replacing words with most impactful words Yes No Change in class & Classification,
in the classification w.r.t Jacobian quantity; distribution Generation
Liang et al. [13] Change characters, insert one hot word, Yes Yes Change in cost function Classification
parenthesis, forged fact
Li et al. [12] Drops certain dimensions of word embeddings, Yes No Change in class confidence Classification
uses RL to find minimal set of words to remove
Ebrahimi et al. [4] Flips the characters/ words in a sentence w.r.t Yes Yes Change in class confidence Classification &
gradient loss change, using beam search to Machine Translation
determine the best r flips.
Gao et al. [5] Change in characters / words w.r.t No No Change in class Classification
token importance
Zhao et al. [21] Generate adversarial examples by using Yes Yes Change in class Textual Entailment &
Adversarially regularized autoencoders. Machine translation
Table 4: Definition used for previous work on adversarial examples
Recently, there has been many previous work done on adversarial examples in the text domain. Broadly
speaking, the attacks can be categorized as gradient based and non-gradient based. For gradient based
attacks the adversarial input is chosen based on change in cost functions and model gradients, which
are also known as white-box attacks for their ability to look into the model while constructing the
adversarial input. Similarly, non-gradient based attacks rely on clever input manipulations such as
misspellings, addition, removal or replacement of words keeping the same semantic meanings. These
kind of attacks are also termed as black-box attacks. We present a brief review over the existing works
in Table 4. We provide an additional column on human perception, which denotes whether the paper
has accounted for human perception of the attack in some way. That is whether the proposed attacks
can be discerned from the original text by human annotators.
A.1 Definitions
Here, we quote various definitions of adversarial examples from a variety of works.
We expect such network to be robust to small perturbations of its input, because small perturbation
cannot change the object category of an image. However, we find that applying an imperceptible non-
random perturbation to a test image, it is possible to arbitrarily change the network’s prediction. [20]
That is, these machine learning models misclassify examples that are only slightly different from
correctly classified examples drawn from the data distribution [6]
Adversarial examples are examples that are created by making small perturbations to the input
designed to significantly increase the loss incurred by a machine learning model [14]
Our goal is to design pairs of sentences such that the NLI relation within a pair (entailment, neutral
or contradiction) can be changed without changing the words involved, simply by changing the word
ordering within each sentence. [3]
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We define an adversary A to be a function that takes in an example (p, q, a), optionally with a
model f , and returns a new example (p0, q0, a0). The adversarial accuracy with respect to A
is Adv(f) = 1|Dtest|
∑
(p,q,a)∈Dtest v(A(p, q, a, f), f)). While standard test error measures the
fraction of the test distribution over which the model gets the correct answer, the adversarial accuracy
measures the fraction over which the model is robustly correct, even in the face of adversarially-
chosen alterations...Instead of relying on paraphrasing, we use perturbations that do alter semantics
to build concatenative adversaries, which generate examples of the form (p + s, q, a) for some
sentence s. In other words, concatenative adversaries add a new sentence to the end of the paragraph,
and leave the question and answer unchanged. [9]
An adversarial sample can be defined as one which appears to be drawn from a particular class by
humans (or advanced cognitive systems) but fall into a different class in the feature space. [18]
maliciously crafted inputs that are undetectable by humans but that fool the algorithm into producing
undesirable behavior [11]
Adversarial examples are inputs to a predictive machine learning model that are maliciously designed
to cause poor performance [4]
One type of the vulnerabilities of machine learning algorithms is that an adversary can change the
algorithm output by subtly perturbing the input, often unnoticeable b y humans. [8]
Adversarial attack on deep neural networks (DNNs) aims to slightly modify the inputs of DNNs and
mislead them to make wrong predictions [1]
For a given sample x and a trained DNN classifier model F, the attacker aims to craft an adversarial
sample x* = x + x by adding a perturbation x to x, such that F(x*) F(x)...In order to maintain the
utility of a text sample, we perturb the sample not only by directly modifying its words, but also
inserting new items (words or sentences) or removing some original ones from it. [13]
A.2 Adversarial Gain Perspectives of Prior Work
Here we examine various works and how they can fit into the adversarial gain perspective. We
already demonstrate how [1] and [4] can be measured in terms of adversarial gain. Rather than
non-overlapping text in [1], we can examine the semantic change of the output. Similarly, we can
examine how well the noise preserves the meaning of the input sentence in both cases. If the semantic
shift is too far, this discounts the shift in output it causes.
Generally, most text-based adversarial attacks constrain their inputs by in some way changing words
while retaining meaning. This includes negation [8], misspelling [8, 18, 13], changing word order [3],
replacing with with synonyms [1], or simply perturbing the word embeddings [14]. In many cases,
such constraints will preserve the meaning of the original text, but often too strict constraints can
result in lower success. For example, in [4] the word-based replacement with a strict synonym
constraint resulted in a low success rate in adversarial examples. In other cases, preservation of word
meaning is not guaranteed. In fact, prior work has used samples from the generated attacks posed
as surveys to determine whether meaning is preserved [9], but this has not typically been done in a
systematic way and Jia and Liang [9] found that in some cases meaning was not preserved. In another
example, negation of phrases does not preserve meaning and thus a model could be totally correct
in changing its output. In all attacks, it is possible to evaluate preservation of meaning by using a
well-defined embedding space (such as [2] as a start) and the cosine distance. The use of such a
distance as we do as part of adversarial gain, allows attacks to change meaning and account for this
when evaluating the change of the model output.
In evaluating the results of an adversarial attack, there are many measures used. For classification
tasks, a change in class label is typically used as a success criterion [21, 5, 11, 18, 3]. In other cases,
notions such as changes in some scoring or cost function are used [1, 9, 8, 14]. However, due to the
change in inputs if the cost relates to the original sentence and the meaning is not preserved, the cost
may be evaluating the wrong criterion without access to an oracle. Thus adversarial gain accounts
for this by discounting output performance changes by the distance from the input. In a well defined
feature space where inputs and outputs are correlated this ensures that as an adversarial input moves
away from its original meaning, this is accounted for in the evaluation criteria to some extent.
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B Extended Perspectives on Adversarial Gain
Here we discuss extended properties and perspectives on adversarial gain.
B.1 Possible Feature Spaces and Distance Metrics to Measure Gain
There are a number of different priors that can be used to measure gain in different ways for different
tasks. While in the main text we examine sentiment classification tasks and text summarization,
others may be relevant in domains such as dialogue systems. For example, one can use sentiment
classification probability and the likelihood divergence (or a step function intersection) to measure
difference in output of a dialogue system, text summary system, or other generative model. Similarly,
various sentence embeddings can be used (Infersent, Doc2Vec, etc.). Word-wise word vector distance
can also be used. Each of these notions of adversarial gain essentially provide a different prior on
the stability of the systems in different ways. For example, it is likely that unless the sentiment of an
input to a dialogue system doesn’t change dramatically, neither should the output.
C Experimental Setup
In our selection of text-based attacks, we examined which attacks provided easily available open-
source code. Many code to replicate experiments was either unavailable or we were unable to find.
We settled on two text-based attacks. We used the Seq2Sick attack on text summarization by Cheng
et al. [1] and the word-level sentiment classification attack by Ebrahimi et al. [4]. Scripts and full
instructions that we used to run the code from these papers is provided at: anonymized. More samples
with gain and distances provided can be found in the codebase provided.
C.1 Text Summarization
We use the pre-trained model and code for a text summarization model based on the Open
Neural Machine Translation toolkit (OpenNMT) [10] as provided by Cheng et al. [1] at
https://github.com/cmhcbb/Seq2Sick. We use the GigaWord corpus the authors reference from [17]
based on prior versions of the datset [7, 15].
When we measure cosine distance, we use the inverse of cosine similarity to follow the intuition
the a distance metric should keep similar words closer together. Assuming that cosine similarity is
bounded [0, 1], cosine distance is 1− |similarity(x, y)|.
C.2 Sentiment Classification
For sentiment classification we use the binary version of the SST dataset [19] called SST2.
This removes all neutral labels. This is the same dataset as used by [4]. We use their pro-
vided code for the word-level adversarial attack and SST2 pre-processing scripts found at:
https://github.com/AnyiRao/WordAdver and https://github.com/AnyiRao/SentDataPre. We use the
pre-trained convolutional neural network classification model provided by the authors and the attack
as provided in our accompanying instructions. The only change we make is that we remove the cosine
similarity requirement on replacement words. We do this because otherwise the attack only generates
attacks for 95 samples. Removing this requires generates attacks for all samples (though many are
not successful). We note that this allows words to be added by replacing padding characters, while
this differs slightly from the attack mentioned by [4], the authors there do discuss that this attack has
a low success rate particularly due to their restrictions. Because adversarial gain as a definition does
not require constraints, this allows us to consider the larger set of attacks.
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